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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court's order denying Two Jim, IIIC.'s("Two Jinn")
motion to set aside forfeiture and exonerate bond and its order denying Two Jinn's motion to
reconsider the denial of that motion.

B. General Course of Proceedings
Roderick Brown was charged with burglary and driving without privileges and the district
couit set his bail at $5000. R. 19-21, 31. On January 16, 2008, Two Jinn - doing business as
AladdinIAnytime Bail Bonds -posted a bond on Mr. Brown's behalf. R. 36-38. On February
12,2008, Mr. Brown appeared in the district court and his trial was continued at the state's
request. R. 5 1-52. Mr. Brown also appeared in court on February 28,2008, April 10,2008, and
April 15,2008. R. 57-58,6346. On June 12, 2008, Mr. Brown failed to appear for court and the
district court forfeited the bond posted by Two Ji~m.R. 69-71.
On October 23,2008, Mr. Brown appeared in coult. R. 72-73. On October 28,2008,
Two Jinn filed a Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond. R. 74. Two Jinn argued
that the Idaho Criminal Rules provide for automatic exoneration when a defendant appears or is
brought before the court within 180 days after the bond is forfeited and, because Mr. Brown
appeared in court within that time frame, it was entitled to exoneration. R. 75. Mr. Brown also
appeared in court on October 30,2008, November 20,2008, and December 8,2008, all of which
were within 180 days followil~gthe district court's order forfeiting the bond. R. 79, 84, 87.
Following a hearing, the district court denied Two Ji~m'smotion on the basis that Idaho Criminal

Rule ("ICR") 46(g), like LC. 5 19-2927,' requires a defendant to satisfactorily excuse his failure
to appear before the hond can he exonerated. R. 98. In the alternative, the district court
concluded that if ICR 46(g) did not require the defendant to excuse his failure to appear and was
thus in conflict with I.C. 5 19-2927, the statute controls because it sets forth a matter of
substance, rather than procedure. R. 98-99. Two Jinn filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the district court also denied. R. 104-114, 128. Mr. Brown was ultimately sentenced to a tenn of
incarceration. R. 136-37. This appeal follows.
111. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the district court err in concluding that ICR 46(g) did not require exoneration

of the hond?
B.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Two Jinn's motion for

reconsideration because ICR 46(g) required exoneration of the bond?
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) Requires Exoneration of the Bond.
Forfeiture, relief from forfeiture, and exoneration of hail are governed by statute and court

rule, Idaho Criminal Rule 46. State v. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651, 653, 167 P.3d
788, 790 (Ct. App. 2007). The district court's conclusion that Rule 46(g) required the defendant
to satisfactorily excuse his failure to appear decided a matter of law, which is reviewed by this
Court de novo. See State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520,523, 198 P.3d 749,752 (Ct. App. 2008)
As discussed in greater detail herein, on April 1,2009, the legislature repealed previous
bail statutes, illcluding LC. 5 19-2927, and enacted the Idaho Bail Act ("the Bail Act"), which
became effective July 1,2009. See 2009 Idaho Laws Ch. 90 (H.B. 184). Similarly, on June 15,
2009, the Idaho Supreme Court repealed ICR 46 in its entirety and adopted a new ICR 46, which
also became effective July 1, 2009.
I

(questions of law reviewed de 11ovo).
The primary purpose of bail is not punitive but, rather, to ensure the presence of the
accused. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792 (Ct. App. 2007). It is not
the purpose of bail to collect revenue for the state. 8A Am. Jur. 2d 5 2. Additionally, public
policy disfavors forfeitures. State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 117-18,952 P.2d
1249, 1253-54 (Ct. App. 1998); see also People v. liar West Ins. Co., 93 Cal.App.4th 791, 795
(2001) (the law traditionally disfavors forfeitures and statutes imposing them are to be strictly
construed).
Prior to the 2009 amendments, ICR 46(g) provided that: "If the defeiendant appears or is
brought before the court within one hundred eighty (180) days after the order forfeiting bail, the
court shall rescind the order of forfeiture and shall exonerate the bond." Prior to the enactment
of the Bail Act, I.C. 5 19-2927 provided: "if at any time within one hundred eighty (180) days
after [the court forfeits the bond], the defendant appears and satisfactorily excuses his neglect, the
court shall direct the forfeiture of the undertaking or the deposit to be exonerated."
The district court concluded that this statute and rule could be read so as not to be in
conflict by grafting I.C. 5 19-2927's requirement that the defendant satisfactorily excuse his
failure to appear into ICR 46(g). However, although the statute and rule can be reasonably
interpreted so as not to conflict, the district court's interpretation was erroneous. Rather, as
further evidenced by the subsequent enactment of the Bail Act and the amendments to the rule,
ICR 46(g) and Section 19-2927 describe alternate methods by which relief from forfeiture can be
obtained. The policies underlying both bail and forfeiture are met by recognizing that ICR 46(g)
requires exoneration where the defendant appears in court within 180 days of forfeiture. Finally,

eve11 if in conflict, bail is a matter of procedure and, thus, ICR 46(g) controls over Section 192927 to the extent any conflict exists between the two
Because Mr. Brown appeared before the court within 180 days after the bond was
forfeited, the district coui-t was required to exonerate the bond. Accordingly, the district court
erred in dellying Two Jinn's motion to exonerate
1.

Rnle 46(g) and Section 19-2927 describe alternate methods by which relief
from forfeitnre can be obtained.

When a statute and rule "can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict between
them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way that results in a conflict."
State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970,974, 188 P.3d 912,916 (2008). Rule 46(g) and Section 19-

2927 can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict between them by recognizing that
they prescribe alternate methods by which relief from forfeiture can be obtained. This
interpretation is reinforced by the subsequent enactment ofthe Bail Act and amendments to ICR
46, which indicate that a forfeiture must be exonerated if the defendant appears before the court
within 180 days of forfeiture or may be set aside if the defendant appears and satisfactorily
excuses his neglect. Recognizing that ICR 46(g) and Section 19-2927 provide for alternate forms
of relief also furthers the policies underlying bail and forfeiture
a.

the Bail Act and the new Rule 46 reinforce that the former Section 192927 and Rnle 46(g) provide alternate forms of relief.

Similar to the former I.C. 3 19-2927, the newly enacted I.C. 3 19-2916 provides that "if
the defendant appears in,court after the entry of the defendailt's failure to appear and
satisfactorily explains his failure to appear, the court may set aside the order of forfeiture and
reinstate bail." Like the fonner ICR 46(g), the newly enacted LC. 5 19-2922(5) provides: "the

court shall order the bail exonerated" when "the defendant has appeared before the court within
one hundred eighty (180) days of the court's order of forfeiture, u ~ ~ l ethe
s s court has set aside the
order of forfeiture and has reinstated bail pursuant to section 19-2916, Idaho Code." Similarly,
the new ICR 46(k)(l) provides: "If the defendant appears before the court where the charge is
pending, within one hundred eighty (180) days after the order forfeiting hail, upon motion of the
person posting bond, if the court has not set aside the forfeituxe, the court shall rescind the order
of forfeiture and shall exonerate the bond."
Thus, the Bail Act provides for relief from forfeiture in circunlstances where the
defendant satisfactorily excuses his failure to appear or where the defendai~tis brought before the
court within 180 days. The new statute, like the old rule and statute, provide for alternate
methods by which relief from forfeiture can be obtained. This coilclusion is reinforced by ICR
46(h)(3), which is identical to the former ICR 46(e)(5), and provides: "if the defendant does not
appear or is not brought before the court within one hundred eighty (180) days after the entry of
the order forfeiting bail, the clerk, upon receiving payment of the forfeited bail, shall remit such
forfeiture to the county auditor for distribution and apportionment." This rule does not set forth a
mecha~~ism
to remit the forfeiture where a defendant appears within 180 days and the court
nonetheless refuses to exonerate the bond.
Rather than recognize that I.C. $ 19-2927 and ICR 46(g) prescribe alternate methods of
relief, the district coua concluded that the requirement that the failure to appear be satisfactorily
excused "should be read to apply to the rule." R. 98. However, in drafting the rule, the Court
was surely aware of the language in LC. 5 19-2927 and, if it indeed intended to graft a
requirement that the failure to appear be satisfactorily excused, it could have easily included

express language to that effect. The absence of such la~guagecannot be reasonably coilstrued as
an intent to include the statutory requirement that a defendant excuse his failure to appear.
Rule 46(g) cannot be reasonably read to require the defendant to satisfactorily excuse his
failure to appear and, instead, plainly requires exoneration when the defendant appears before the
court within 180 days of forfeiture. However, ICR 46(g) call be read so as not to conflict with
LC. 5 19-2927 by recognizing that the former rule and statute, like the new Bail Act, provide for
alteinate methods of obtaining relief from forfeiture.
b.

recognizing that I.C. 5 19-2927 and ICR 46(g) prescribe alternate
methods of the relief furthers the purpose of bail and forfeiture.

The priinary purpose of bail is to ensure the defendant's appearance in court and not to
punish the surety. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792. The purpose of
forfeiture is to create an incentive for sureties to take reasonable steps to supervise and recapture
fugitive defendants. State v. Ventuva, 952 A.2d 1049, 1054 (N.J 2008). Exoneration as set forth
in ICR 46(g) furthers the primary purpose of bail because it provides for automatic exoneration
when the defendant has appeared in court. Rule 46(g) also furthers the pulpose of forfeiture by
providing an incentive to the bail and the defendant to effectuate the defendant's re-appearance
following a failure to appear.
Contrary to the district court's reasoning, the excuse for failure to appear requirement is
neither reasonable nor appropriate: "to ensure that the defendant has the proper motivation for
malting a timely appearance" because "if the defendant can automatically get his money back by
appearing anytime within 180 days, then there is no reason why the defendant should appear on
time." R. 98. Initially, a defendant has plenty of incentive to appear in court apart from
forfeiture, not the least of which is preventing a new felony charge of "bail jumping" pursuant to

I.C.

5 18-7401 or incurring the displeasure of the court that will ultimately sentence him.
Moreover, the district court's reasoning ignores the nature and prevalence of surety bail

bonds. In the case of a surety bail agent, the defendant pays a non refundable premium. See I.C.

5 41-1042 (premiums allowable charge in bail transaction).

Thus, the defendant does not "get his

money back" by appearing in court and, instead, the bail avoids the forfeiture. The primary
rationale of bail forfeiture is not to provide an incentive for the defendant to appear and, instead,
is to create an incentive for sureties to take reasonable steps to recapture fugitive defendants. See
Ventura,952 A.2d at 1054. Where a defendant who fails to appear is brought before the court,

the purpose of bail is satisfied.
That mandatory exoneration pursuant to former ICR 46(g) furthers the purpose of bail is
reinforced by the Bail Act, which provides for automatic exoneration where the defendant
appears before the court within 180 days, and was enacted in part to "ensure the appearance of
defendants before the courts." LC. $5 19-2902(2)(a), 19-2922(5). For instance, here, Mr. Brown
was retunled to the court and ultimately sentenced for his crime. Thus, the purpose of bailensuring the defendant appears in court to answer the charges at hand - was ultimately fulfilled.
To require Two J i m to pay the forfeiture under such circumstances simply punishes Two Jinn
and generates revenue for the state.
Additionally, to satisfy the purpose of both bail and forfeiture, it is important to give the
bail incentive to ensure that the defendant is returned to the court in one manner or another.
There are a number of ways a bail agent can effectuate a defendant's re-appearance in addition to
surrendering the defendant to the county in which the case is pending. For instance, a bail agent
might begin with calling on relatives and friends (particularly those that posted collateral to

secure the bail) to pressure the defendant into voluntarily re-appearing. A bail agent might utilize
investigatory efforts to locate the defendant in another county or state but, based on concerns
regarding a breach of the peace, may prefer to have law enforcement arrest the defendant.
Refusing to aclcnowledge automatic exoneration pursuant to ICR 46(g) creates the perverse
incentive for bail agents to surrender the defendants themselves, even where less intrusive means
can effectuate the defendant's appearance in court or where law enforcement would be better
equipped to prevent a breach of the peace. Limiting a bail agent's ability to obtain exoneration to
circumstances where the defendant provides a satisfactory excuse or the bail agent surrenders the
defendant to the county where the case is pending would discourage bail agents from effectuating
the defendant's appearance in coua through other means.
Finally, to not recognize automatic exoneration pursuant to ICR 46(g) would lead to an
absurd result. Pursuant to fonner 1.C. S, 19-2925, "the bail, at any time before they are finally
discharged, and at any place within the state" inay arrest the defendant. If Two Jinn had
surrendered Mr. Bro~vnto the Ada County Jail within the 180 days, its bond would have been
exonerated. See I.C. S, 19-2927. Here, Mr. Brown was in the custody of the Ada County Jail
months before the 180'~day following forfeiture. R. 79,84, 87 (court minutes noting the
defendant was in custody). Because Section 19-2925 permits the bail to arrest the defendant at
"any place in the state," Two Jinn was authorized to arrest Mr. Brown at the Ada County Jail.
However, assuming the jail would petmit it to do so, it would make no sense to require Two Jinn
to arrest Mr. Brown while he was already in the Ada County Jail's custody, so that it could in
turn surrender him thereto in order to get bond exonerated.

c.

conclusion.

As evidenced by the newly enacted statue which permits a bail agent to obtain
exoneration where the defendant appears before the court within 180 days or where he
satisfactorily excuses his failure to appear, fonner I.C. 5 19-2927 and ICR 46(g) also provide
alternate methods for a bail to be exonerated. Because the rule and statute do notconflict and
Mr. Brown was brought before the court within 180 days of forfeiture, Two J i m was entitled to
exoneration of its bond. This interpretation furthers both the purpose of bail and forfeiture. The
district court therefore erred in deilyiiig Two Jim's motion to exonerate.
2.

Rule 46(g) prevails over S e c t i o ~19-2927
~
to the extent any conflict exists.

"Where conflict exists between statutory criminal provisions and the Idaho Criminal
Rules in matters of procedure, the rules will prevail." State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 541,

700 P.2d 942,944 (1985). In Cuvrington, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed "whether the
granting of bail is a matter of substa~~tive
law and therefore within the exclusive province of the
legislature or whether . . . the question is merely one of procedure and therefore a matter falling
within the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court." Id. at 540,700 P.2d at 943. "The
fixing of bail and release from custody are matters traditionally within the discretion of the
courts." Id. at 541, 700 P.2d at 944. The inherent power to fix bail is grounded in the power to
hold a defendant. Id. Therefore, bail relates to the maimer of ensuring that the alleged offense
will be heard by the court and is essentially procedural in nature. Id.
Additionally, the decision to automatically exonerate a bond when a defendant appears
within 180 days furthers judicial efficiency and relates to the administration of the courts. A bail
agent who assists in bringing a defendant before the court, but who did not surrender him to the

pertinent county jail, could move for exoneration pursuant to ICR 46(e)(4), which permits the
court to set aside a forfeiture and exonerate bond when justice does not require enforcement of
the forfeiture. Such fact intensive motions necessarily use the judiciary's resources. Where the
defendant re-appears in court within 180 days, the purpose of bail and forfeiture has been
satisfied. Thus, rather than punish the surety through forfeiture or take up the judiciary's
resources through motions under ICR 46(e)(4), Rule 46(g) relates to the administration of the
courts by providing for automatic exoneration, which furtllers the interest in judicial efficiency.
Rule 46, both in its present and former incarnations, sets forth the procedural mechanism
through which bail is administered, including its modification, revocation, forfeiture, and
exoneration. Bail and forfeiture ensure the defendant's presence in cou1-1and thus relate to the
manner in which the matter will be heard. Accordingly, ICR 46(g) necessarily relates to matters
of procedure and, as such, if a conflict between ICR 46(g) and LC. $ 19-2927 exists, the rule
must prevail.
This interpretation has been formerly adopted by the Fifth Judicial District for the State of
Idaho through its bail bond guidelines. 111a section titled "Sources of Law," the guidelines note:
"In some areas, there exist conflicts between the criminal rules of procedure adopted by the Idaho
Supreme Court and the statutes adopted by the Legislature. According to State v. Cuvrington,
108 Idaho 539, if a conflict exists, the rules of procedure prevail." Page 7, Guidelines for the
Administration of Bail and Bail Bonds in the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Effective September 30, 1997, Updated: November 6, 2007, available online at

l1ttp://twinfallscounty.org/Bail%20Bond%2OGuidIines%2Oupdate%2ONovO7.pdf

The Fifth

District Guidelines further note a conflict between I.C. $19-2927 and ICR 46(g) and indicate:

"this again is a coilflict between the rules and the statutes, and as such, ICR 46(g) prevails." Id.
at p. 38; see also id. at p. 39.
Without acknowledging or distinguishing Currington, the district court concluded "the
statute defines when [the right to relief from forfeiture] exists -when the bondsman brings the
defendant before the court or when the defendant otherwise appears and satisfactorily excuses his
neglect. How the court is to determine if the defendant has excused his neglect and how the
court is to effectuate or actually carry out the exoneration of the bond are procedural issues." R.

38. The district court's characterization of relief from forfeiture as a "right" does not resolve
whether ICR 46 and 1.C. 519-2927 deal with matters of substance, rather than procedure. Bail
can also be characterized as a "right," hut relates to the manner in which an alleged offense will
be heard and is thus a matter of procedure within the province of the judiciary. See Currington,
108 Idaho at 541,700 P.2d at 944. Because ICR 46 describes the procedural n~echanislnthrough
which bail is administered, modified, revoked, forfeited and exonerated, it relates to the manner
in which the case will be heard and is a procedural function within the judiciary's authority.
Relief from forfeiture is intertwined with bail itself and is part and parcel with the maimer
in which the case will be heard. Accordingly, ICR 46 sets forth procedural rules and to the extent
those rules conflict with statute, the rules prevails. The district court therefore erred in denying
Two Jim's motion for exoneration.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying T w o Jinn's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Two Jim1 filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that it was entitled to exoneration

pursuai~tto ICR 46(g) because there was no conflict between ICR 46(g) and I.C. 5 19-2927 and
that forfeiture remedies are procedural in nature. R. 110-12. Two J i m further noted that,

contrary to the district court's concern, the state could recoup extradition costs i11 the absence of
forfeiture.' R. 113. The district court denied Two Jinn's inotion asserting that the
reconsideration niotion did not provide any information that changed its previous conclusions.
R. 128.
A decision to grant a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Straub v. Sinitlz, 145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d 754,760 (2007). In reviewing a trial court's exercise

of discretion, this Court considers whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consisteilt with
applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Rupp,
123 Idaho 1,3,843 P.2d 151, 153 (1992); QuickRelease Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d
at 792.
Here, the district court abused its discretion in denying Two Jinn's motion for
reconsideration because it failed to act consistently with applicable legal standards. As set forth
above, ICR 46(g) plainly requires exoneration where the defendant is brought before the court
within 180 days of forfeiture. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the district court erroneously
interpreted the rule as requiring the defendant to satisfactorily excuse his failure to appear and
erroneously concluded that the rule dealt with matters of substance instead of procedure. The
district court relied on its previous reasoning to deny Two Jim's motion for reconsideration and,
thus, failed to act consistently with applicable legal standards. Accordingly, the district court
abused its discretion in denying Two Jinn's motion for reconsideration.
Pursuant to the Bail Act and the revised ICR 46, "where the defendant was not retunled
by the person posting bail to the sheriff of the couilty where the action is pending, the court may
condition the exoneration of bail and the setting aside of the forfeiture on payment by the person
posting bail" of any costs incurred by law enforcement from transporting the defendant to the jail
of the county where the charges are pending. LC. $ 19-2922; ICR(k).

V. CONCLUSION

Two J i m respectfully asks that this Court vacate the district court's orders denying its
motion to set aside the forfeiture, and its motion for reconsideratio~lof that order, and enter an
order exonerating the bond.
Respectfully submitted this

day of July 2009.
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